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 Levin v. Commerce Energy
1
 considers whether state authorities may 
discriminatorily tax the sale and distribution of natural gas to Ohio 
                                                 
   Class of 2012, Washington and Lee University School of Law. 
 1.  See Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 230 S. Ct. 2323, 2325 (2010) (holding that 
"under the comity doctrine, a taxpayer’s complaint of allegedly discriminatory state taxation, 
even when framed as a request to increase a competitor’s tax burden, must proceed 
originally in state court."). 
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consumers.
2
  Plaintiffs-respondents Commerce Energy, Interstate Gas 
Supply and Gregory Slone sued Richard A. Levin, Tax Commissioner of 
Ohio, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, alleging 
tax discrimination against independent marketers in the natural gas 
industry.
3
  Ultimately, this case questions whether a federal district court 
maintains the appropriate authority to rule on tax discrimination complaints 







 Ohio residents typically purchase natural gas from local distribution 
companies (LDCs) servicing their particular region.
5
  Such customers may 
alternatively elect to purchase gas from independent marketers (IMs).
6
  
LDCs own and operate their own natural gas pipelines, providing both gas 
and delivery as a bundled product.
7
  In contrast, IMs provide their own gas 
supply but rely on LDC pipelines for service.
8
  Customers who opt for an 
IM provider thus receive gas from the IM, and delivery from the LDC.
9
  
Based on this discrepancy, Ohio treats LDCs and IMs differently for tax 
purposes, providing three tax exemptions to LDCs that IMs may not 
claim.
10
  First, LDCs are exempt from the standard sales and use taxes that 
IMs must pay.
11
  Instead, LDCs pay a gross receipts excise tax, which is 
lower than the IMs’ sales and use taxes.
12
  Additionally, "LDCs are not 
subject to the commercial activities tax imposed on IMs’ taxable gross 
receipts."
13
  Lastly, inter-LDC gas sales are also excluded from the gross 
receipts tax, which their IM counterparts must pay if purchasing gas from 
an LDC.
14
   
 Respondents sued Petitioner Richard A. Levin, Tax Commissioner of 
Ohio, in federal court, claiming discriminatory taxation of IMs in violation 
of the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses.
15
  Respondents sought 
                                                 
2 See id. at 2328 (providing a summary analysis regarding the applicability of the Tax 
Injunction Act, comity doctrine and Hibbs v. Winn, 124 S. Ct. 2276 (2004)). 
 3.  Id. at 2328–29. 
 4.  Id. at 2328. 
 5.  See id. (discussing the schematics of Ohio gas supply and distribution). 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Levin, 130 S. Ct. at 2328. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  See id. (detailing the relevant tax exemptions).  
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Levin, 130 S. Ct. at 2328. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. at 2328–29. 
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declaratory and injunctive relief, requesting that Petitioner invalidate and 
refuse to recognize or enforce the tax exemptions.
16
  In granting the 
Commissioner’s motion to dismiss, the District Court held that the Tax 
Injunction Act (TIA)
17
 did not bar the lawsuit, but nevertheless refused to 
exercise jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
18
  The Court of Appeals 
reversed, agreeing with the District Court’s TIA analysis but disagreeing as 
to the comity issue.
19
   In reaching its decision, the Sixth Circuit determined 
that a footnote in Hibbs v. Winn
20
 effectively limited the scope of the 
comity doctrine in such cases.
21
  Agreeing with the District Court’s 
dismissal on comity considerations, the Supreme Court reversed the 
appellate ruling, stating that the "Ohio courts are better positioned to 
determine – unless and until the Ohio Legislature weighs in – how to 
comply with the mandate of equal treatment."
22




 In a 9-0 opinion, the Supreme Court ruled that "comity 
considerations . . . preclude the exercise of lower federal-court adjudicatory 
authority over this controversy, given that an adequate state-court forum is 
available to hear and decide respondents’ constitutional claims."
23
  Within 
its comity analysis, the Court conceded that the Tax Injunction Act 
similarly prohibits federal courts from ruling on "the assessment, levy or 
collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient 
remedy may be had in the courts of such State."
24
  However, without 
specifically ruling as to TIA applicability, the Court determined that the 
                                                 
 16.  Id. at 2329. 
 17.  Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2010). 
 18.  See Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 2323, 2329 (2010) (explaining the 
lack of exercise of jurisdiction by the court). "The TIA did not block the suit, the District 
Court initially held, because Respondents . . . were ‘third-parties challenging the 
constitutionality of [another’s] tax benefit,’ and their requested relief ‘would not disrupt the 
flow of tax revenue’ to the State." (quoting Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 
24a, Levin, 130 S. Ct. 2323 (No. 09-233).   
 19.  See id.  ("While agreeing that the TIA did not bar respondents’ suit, the Sixth 
Circuit rejected the District Court’s comity ruling.").  
 20.  See Hibbs v. Winn, 124 S. Ct. 2276, 2284–92 (2004) (determining that neither the 
TIA nor the comity doctrine prohibited federal adjudication of an Establishment Clause 
challenge to a state tax credit that provided public funds to parochial schools). 
 21.  See Levin, 130 S. Ct. at 2329 ("A footnote in Hibbs, the Court of Appeals 
believed, foreclosed the District Court’s ‘expansive reading’ of this Court’s comity 
precedents."). 
 22.  Id. at 2335. 
 23.  Id. at 2330. 
 24.  Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2010). 
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comity doctrine controls in this case.
25
  Furthermore, the Court 
distinguished Hibbs v. Winn in holding that comity doctrine considerations 
prevail in circumstances such as those brought forth in Levin, where 
plaintiff-respondents seek to improve their position within the tax scheme.
26
   
 
IV. Future Implications 
 
 Unless and until state courts rule on this matter, the disparity between 
LDC and IM tax treatment may have negative ramifications for the natural 
gas industry.  Through this ruling, the Supreme Court has taken a decidedly 
hands-off approach with regard to taxation of the natural gas industry.  
Avoiding judicial legislation, the Court instead urges state government to 
take control.  However, until such state action occurs, disproportionate tax 
treatment may negatively affect how both the cost and supply of natural gas 
are passed down to consumers.  In Ohio, for example, tax differentials 
between natural gas providers may lead to a more monopolistic industry as 
IMs endure disparate operating costs.  Such added costs forced upon IMs 
will likely be passed down to consumers.  Those added costs could 
effectively trigger an avalanche effect, as consumers instead opt for the 
better financial alternative – LDC natural gas supply. 
 
                                                 
 25.  See Levin, 130 S. Ct. at 2332–33 ("[W]e hold that comity precludes the exercise of 
original federal-court jurisdiction in cases of the kind presented here."). 
 26.  See id. at 2336 (providing three factors that form the basis as to why the comity 
doctrine controls). 
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 This case requires an understanding of the Mobile-Sierra Doctrine. 
The Federal Power Act (FPA) authorizes the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) to oversee the regulation of inter-state power grids, to 
approve contracts for the sale of power, and to ensure that all such contracts 
contain rates that are "just and reasonable."
1
  In 1956, the Supreme Court 
released twin decisions which held that FERC must presume that contract 
rates freely negotiated between reasonable parties meet the just and 
reasonable standard in the FPA.
2
  These twin-holdings came to be known as 
the Mobile-Sierra Doctrine.  In 1968, the Court expanded on the Mobile-
Sierra Doctrine, explaining that "the [FPA] is premised on contractual 
agreements voluntarily devised by the regulated companies; it contemplates 




 In 2008, the Court expanded the Mobile-Sierra Doctrine again.  In 
Morgan Stanley v. Public Utility District No. 1, the Court held that the 
Mobile-Sierra presumption of just and reasonable terms in a freely 
negotiated contract disputed before FERC applies a purposefully high bar to 
challengers who are either purchasers of wholesale electricity or sellers.
4
  
The Court noted the reasoning for such a high-bar to challenging contracts 
as the substantial need to "foster[] stability in the electricity market, to the 
long run benefit of consumers."
5
  
Condensing the Court's jurisprudence on the Mobile-Sierra 
Doctrine, it can be said that the doctrine prohibits FERC from invalidating a 
                                                 
   Class of 2012, Washington and Lee University School of Law. 
 1. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791(a)–824(a) (1990). 
 2.  See Fed. Power Comm. v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355 (1956) 
(providing some understanding of what the just and reasonable standard suggests).  "[W]hile 
it may be that [FERC] may not normally impose upon a public utility a rate which would 
produce less than a fair return  . . . In such circumstances the sole concern of [FERC] would 
seem to be whether the rate is so low as to adversely affect the public interest  . . . ." See also 
United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp. et al., 350 U.S. 332 (1956).   
 3.  Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 822 (1968).  
 4.  See Morgan Stanley Capital Group v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 128 S. 
Ct. 233, 2747 (2008) ("We hold only that FERC may abrogate a valid contract only if it 
harms the public interest").  
 5.  NRG Power Marketing v. Maine Pub. Util. Comm., 130 S. Ct. 693, 700 (2010).  
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contract unless the terms of the contract are wholly against public interest.
6
  






 "For many years, New England's supply of electricity capacity was 
barely sufficient to meet the region's demands."
8
  In 2006, the New England 
Independent System Operator, which runs the region's power grid, entered 
into an agreement with a group of electrical generators.
9
  This agreement 
established a market mechanism that would set prices by auction at later 
dates, but would in-theory provide enough electricity for New England 
consumers.
10
  The agreement, which was reached after negotiations of 115 
parties,
11
 stipulated that any challenges to the prices of the energy supply 
will be adjudicated under the Mobile-Sierra "public interest" standard.
12
  
After the agreement was approved by FERC, six of the eight objecting 
parties challenged FERC's approval in federal court.
13
  These parties 
claimed that the Mobile-Sierra Doctrine should not apply to challenges 
from non-contracting parties.
14
  They claimed non-contracting parties 
should be held to a lower challenging standard with no presumption of just 
and reasonable terms.
15
  On this issue, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
found for the objectors.
16
  
 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the 
Mobile-Sierra standard should apply when a contract rate is "challenged by 
an entity that was not a party to the contract."
17




The Court held that the Mobile-Sierra presumption applies to all 
parties.
18
  Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsberg notes that "if FERC itself 
                                                 
 6.  See Fed. Power Comm., 350 U.S. at 354–44 (" . . . [T]he sole concern of the 
Commission would seem to be whether the rate is so low as to adversely affect the public 
interest . . . .").  
 7.  See Morgan Stanley Capital Group, 128 S. Ct. at 2737. (finding that FERC must 
presume a contract for wholesale energy that has been freely negotiated meets the statutory 
just and reasonable requirement).  
 8.  NRG Power Marketing, 130 S. Ct. at 694.  
 9.  Id. at 697.  
 10.  Id. at 697–98.  
 11.  See id. at 697 (noting that eight of these 115 parties opposed the agreement).  
 12.  Id.  
 13.  Id. 
 14.  See NRG Power Marketing, 130 S. Ct. at 697.  
 15.  Id.  
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. at 698.  
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must presume just and reasonable a contract rate resulting from fair, arms-
length negotiations, how can it be maintained that noncontracting parties 
nevertheless may escape that presumption?"
19
 
Justice Ginsburg characterized the Circuit Court's analysis of the 
Mobile-Sierra doctrine as incorrect. 
20
  The D.C. Circuit claimed the "public 
interest" standard was at odds with the "just and reasonable" standard."
21
  
However, the Court found that the two standards work in tandem. 
22
  FERC 
should use the public interest standard as a frame by which to evaluate 
"what it means for a rate to satisfy the just-and-reasonable standard."
23
 
 The Court found that to allow noncontracting parties to circumvent 
the Mobile-Sierra doctrine would undermine the doctrine's stated goal of 
promoting stability of energy supply.
24
  The Court stated in dicta that third-
party interests are well-served by the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, as any 




 The Mobile-Sierra doctrine serves as a guidepost for FERC to 
evaluate whether energy contracts rise to the standards of good public 
policy.  In this decision, the Court reiterated the benchmarks by which 
FERC can judge these contracts.  First, the contracts are negotiated by 
sophisticated parties. 
26
  Secondly, the interest in providing those parties 
with predictable and consistent review of their contracts outweighs the 
interest in third-party challenges.
27
  Therefore, the Court finds, having a 
high-bar like the "just and reasonable" presumption apply to third-party 
challenges as well as challenges from parties who were part of the 
negotiation serves the public interest in a stable energy supply by ensuring 
contracts are not capriciously invalidated by FERC.
28
  
                                                                                                                 
 18.  See Id. at 701 (holding that the "Mobile-Sierra presumption does not depend on 
the identity of the complainant who seeks FERC investigation.").  
 19.  Id. at 700.  
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id.  
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. (quoting Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 621). 
 24.  See NRG Power Marketing, 130 S. Ct. at 701 ("A presumption applicable to 
contracting parties only . . . could scarcely provide the stability Mobile-Sierra aimed to 
secure."). 
 25.  Id. at 700 (quoting Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 621). 
 26.  See id. at 699 (noting that the contracts that are reviewed by FERC are "freely 
negotiated" between "sophisticated parties"). 
 27.  See id. at 701 ("A presumption applicable to contracting parties only . . . could 
scarcely provide the stability Mobile-Sierra aimed to secure.").  
 28.  See id. (noting the "essential role of contracts" in providing "stability [for] the 
electricity market, for the longrun (sic) benefit of consumers").  
304 2 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE, & ENV'T 297 (2011) 
 The Court reversed the Circuit Court's opinion with regard to the 
District court's application of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine and remanded the 






 Justice Stevens issued a lone dissent in this case.  Justice Stevens 
expressed concern about the favorability shown towards energy producers 
and companies and the lack of concern for individual consumers.
30
  He 
found little comfort in the Court's dicta stating third-party interests are 
already well-served in the Mobile-Sierra doctrine.  Justice Stevens views 
the doctrine as setting too high a bar for a challenge to a contract rate, as 




 Justice Stevens characterized the true purpose of the Mobile-Sierra 
doctrine as preventing an energy seller from unilaterally repudiating a 
contract due to market fluctuation. 
32
  According to Justice Stevens, only if 
the market fluctuation would drive an energy seller out of business would 
the seller meet the bar of Mobile-Sierra—impairing the public interest by 
stopping energy production—and thus, be allowed by FERC to alter the 
contract.
33
  Justice Stevens found that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine was 
altered by the Court's decision in Morgan Stanley v. Public Utility District 
No. 1 to create a presumption of a "just and reasonable contract." 
 Justice Stevens believes the public interest is "the interest of 
consumers in paying 'the lowest possible reasonable rate consistent with the 
maintenance of adequate service,'" an interest which is greater than the 
interest in contract stability
34
  Justice Stevens found the Court's extension of 
the Mobile-Sierra doctrine to challenges from noncontracting parties to be 
adverse to the interest of the consumers.  As the general public, a third-
party to the contract negotiations, will end up paying the rates to purchase 
                                                 
 29.  See id. at 701 ("[T]he judgment of the Court of Appeals . . . is reversed to the 
extent that it rejects to the application of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine to noncontracting 
parties.").  
 30.  Id. at 701-02 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The Court held the [FERC] could not set 
aside such a contract as unjust and unreasonable, even though it saddled consumers with a 
duty to pay prices that would be considered unjust and unreasonable under normal market 
conditions . . . "). 
 31.  Id. at 702 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 
U.S. at 822 ("[U]nder the Mobile-Sierra presumption, setting aside a contract rate requires a 
finding of 'unequivocal public necessity.")).   
 32.  Id. at 701 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 33.  Id.  
 34.  Id. at 702 ("[U]nder the Mobile-Sierra presumption, setting aside a contract rate 
requires a finding of 'unequivocal public necessity . . . .') (citing Morgan Stanley, 128 S. Ct. 
2733 (slip. op. at 22) (Stevens, J., dissenting (quoting Permian Basin, 390 U.S. at 793)).  
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energy from the utility, their interests are not represented a contract 
negotiated by a wholesaler and a distributor.
35
  As Justice Stevens doubts 
that the ordinary consumer's interests are representing in the contract 





V. Future Implications 
 
 This decision does not break new ground in contracts, administrative 
or energy regulatory law.  In the past year, FERC has cited the decision 
twice in opinions upholding contract agreements,
37
 which may validate 
Justice Stevens's concern that the standard sets the bar too high for FERC to 
protect consumers.
38
  FERC cited NRG in an opinion requiring a public 
utility to provide information on the tariffs it has levied against energy 
suppliers.
39
   By exercising its oversight authority to review tariffs aimed at 
reigning in energy suppliers, and using the NRC decision to do so, FERC 
may be benefiting "big energy" by hindering the public utilities' pricing 
power.  
 Professor Robin Craig cited the NRG Power case as evidence of the 
leeway courts will give to Congress regulating the energy industry under 
the instate commerce clause.
40
  Professor Craig found that decisions such as 
NRG Power show the courts given broad interpretations to statutes such as 
the FPA.
41
  She notes that Congress now has authority over "the 
                                                 
 35.  Id. at 703. 
 36.  See id. (explaining that there should be a lower standard).  "[By] requiring that 
FERC find some greater degree of harm to the public than would be required under the 
ordinary just-and-reasonable standard . . . the Mobile-Sierra doctrine leaves little room for 
respondents—at least one of which did not negotiate the rate but must nonetheless purchase 
electricity at [this] price . . . —to assert their private interest in making a rate challenge." 
 37.  See Kentucky Municipal Power Agency v. E.ON U.S., 132 F.E.R.C. P63,007, 
66,064 (F.E.R.C. 2010) ("The settlement . . . can be found by the Commission to be fair and 
reasonable and in the public interest.") 66,067 (using the NRG Power Marketing decision to 
set the standard of review).  See also High Island Offshore Sys., 131 F.E.R.C. P63,007, 
P63,025 (F.E.R.C. 2010) (setting the standard of review using the NRG Power Marketing 
decision to set the standard for review and approving the Settlement Agreement).  
 38.  Supra note 25.  
 39.  See Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. v. Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys., 131 
F.E.R.C. P61,163, 61,720 (F.E.R.C. 2010) (ordering Midwest ISO to revise their tariff plan) 
61,725, n.37 (using the NRG Power Marketing decision to set the standard for review). 
 40.  See Robin Kundis Craig, Multistate Decision Making for Renewable Energy and 
Transmission: Spotlight on Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. 81 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 771 n.36. 
 41.  See id. at 780 ("Moreover, [the Court] suggests that Congress's authority over 
energy, including renewable energy, remains very broad.").  
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transmission of electricity, rates, rate-making, and even the sources of fuel 
used to produce electricity."
42
 
 Though the effects of NRG Power are still being determined, it is clear 
that the impact of this case is vast, in so far as it creates a very high bar to 
overturn negotiated agreements vis a vis energy pricing.  Justice Stevens’ 
dissent notes that the Mobile-Sierra presumption gives industry great 
leeway in setting prices, and not allowing third-parties to challenge without 
overcoming the presumption provides no check for high prices in the 
energy market.
43
  While Justice Stevens is undeniably correct that 
consumers have an interest in the lowest prices possible, there is an equally 
strong  interest in having reliable energy supply.  If third-parties are able to 
challenge contracts at a lower burden, then the negotiating parties will not 
be able to rely on the terms of their negotiations.  Contracts negotiated at 
arms-length between competing parties will ensure prices do not rise to an 
unreasonable level, and any collusion between the competing utility and 
distributor would invalidate the contract as against public-interest.  The 
Mobile-Sierra doctrine protects freedom of contract and allows for a 
constant supply of energy at a predictable contract price.   
                                                 
 42.  Id.  
 43.  NRG Power Marketing, 130 S. Ct. at 703 (Stevens J., dissenting) 
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 South Carolina v. North Carolina
1
 came as an appeal to a Court-
appointed Special Master’s unilateral 2009 decision to permit three 
nongovernmental entities to intervene in the two states’ ongoing 
dispute over riparian rights.
2
  It concerned the applicability of the 
Supreme Court’s longstanding holding in New Jersey v. New York,
3
 
which stood for the proposition that "[a]n intervenor whose state is 
already a party should have the burden of showing some compelling 
interest in his own right, apart from his interest in a class with all 
other citizens and creatures of the state, which interest is not 
properly represented by the state."
4
  The State of South Carolina 
("South Carolina") contested the Special Master’s conclusions on the 
grounds that the three non-governmental entities had not sufficiently 
                                                 
   Class of 2012, Washington and Lee University School of Law. 
 1. South Carolina v. North Carolina (South Carolina II), 130 S. Ct. 854, 854 (2010). 
 2.  See South Carolina II, 130 S. Ct. at 858–59 ("After holding a hearing, the Special 
Master granted the [three non-state entities the right to intervene] and, upon South Carolina's 
request, memorialized the reasons for her decision in a First Interim Report.  South Carolina 
then presented exceptions, and we set the matter for argument."). 
 3.  New Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 369, 373 (1953) (holding that the City of 
Philadelphia should not be allowed to intervene because its interests were adequately 
represented by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania).  In New Jersey, the Supreme Court 
considered whether the City of Philadelphia may intervene in an original action in which the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was already a party.  See id. at 370.  The State of New 
Jersey had brought suit against the State of New York and the City of New York seeking an 
equitable diversion of the Delaware River, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania had 
been allowed to intervene pro interesse suo.  See id. at 370–71.  When the trial court’s 
entered a decree enjoining the defendants from diverting from the Delaware River more than 
440,000,000 gallons or water daily, the City of New York moved for a modification to the 
decree; in response, the City of Philadelphia made a motion to intervene.  See id. at 371–72.  
However, the Supreme Court denied the City of Philadelphia’s motion upon determining 
that its interests could not be distinguished from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s.  See 
id. at 372–73.  Observing that "[a]n intervenor whose state is already a party should have the 
burden of showing some compelling interest in his own right, apart from his interest in a 
class with all other citizens and creatures of the state, which interest is not properly 
represented by the state," the Court determined that the City of Philadelphia had not met its 
burden and denied its motion.  Id. at 373.  
 4.  Id. at 373 (emphasis added). 
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demonstrated that their interests were distinct from that of the State 




 South Carolina initially had filed suit against North Carolina in 
2007 by invoking the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to gain 
equitable apportionment of the Catawba River.
5
  Their dispute was 
thought to have been on course for an eventual resolution when the 
Court appointed in January of 2009 a "Special Master"
6
 who would 
have "the authority to fix the time and conditions for the filing of 
additional pleadings,"
7
 among several other specifically enumerated 
privileges.
8
  However, when the Special Master granted three 
nongovernmental entities—namely, the Catawba River Water Supply 
Project ("CRWSP"), Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC ("Duke Energy"), 
and the city of Charlotte, North Carolina ("Charlotte")—to intervene 
in the action as separate parties upon determining that they all 
appeared to have satisfied the requirements set forth in New Jersey,
9
 
South Carolina took exceptions to her findings and appealed,
10
 
thereby prompting the Court to take this case up for a second time for 
the purposes of clarifying its holding in New Jersey.  
 Thus, at issue before the Court in this case was whether South 
Carolina’s exceptions to the Special Master’s findings had been 
justified, or to put it another way, whether CRWSP, Duke Energy, 
                                                 
 5.  See South Carolina II, 130 S. Ct. at 858 ("The State of South Carolina brought this 
original action against the State of North Carolina, seeking an equitable apportionment of the 
Catawba River.")  See also id. at 859 (noting that South Carolina sought "a decree that 
equitably apportions the Catawba River . . . , enjoins North Carolina from authorizing 
[excessive] transfers of water . . . , and declares North Carolina’s permitting statute invalid 
to the extent it is used to authorize [excessive] transfers of water . . . .") 
 6.  South Carolina v. North Carolina (South Carolina I), 128 S. Ct. 1117, 1117 
(2008). 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  See id. (stating that the Special Master shall have several powers).  These powers 
include the power "to direct subsequent proceedings, to summon witnesses, to issue 
subpoenas, and to take such evidence as may be introduced and such as she may deem it 
necessary to call for. The Special Master is directed to submit Reports as she may deem 
appropriate."   
 9.  See South Carolina II, 130 S. Ct. at 861 ("[T]he Special Master found that each 
proposed intervenor had a sufficiently compelling interest to justify intervention. "). 
 10.  See id. at 858–59 ("After holding a hearing, the Special Master granted the 
motions and, upon South Carolina's request, memorialized the reasons for her decision in a 
First Interim Report. South Carolina then presented exceptions, and we set the matter for 
argument."). 
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and Charlotte should have been allowed to intervene as separate 
parties to the action under New Jersey.
11





 the broader rule that the Special Master had 
used to allow all three parties to intervene in the action,
14
 noting that 
"a compelling reason for allowing citizens to participate in one 
original action is not necessarily a compelling reason for allowing 
citizens to intervene in all original actions"
15
  Instead, he considered 
each of the three nongovernmental entities’ interests separately to 
determine whether each had satisfied New Jersey’s "appropriate 
intervention" standard.
16
  Ultimately, he concluded that CRWSP and 
Duke Energy had satisfied New Jersey’s "appropriate intervention" 
standard,
17
 but that the city of Charlotte had not.
18




 Specifically, Justice Alito noted in his opinion that CRWSP had 
"carried its burden of showing a compelling interest in the outcome 
of this litigation that distinguishes [it] from all other citizens of the 
party States."
19
  Given CRWSP’s "unusual" position as a product of a 
joint venture between the two states,
20
 he stated that "neither State 
                                                 
 11.  See id. at 861 ("Applying [New Jersey], the Special Master found that each 
proposed intervenor had a sufficiently compelling interest to justify intervention. The 
Special Master rejected South Carolina’s proposal to limit intervention to the remedy phase 
of this litigation and recommended that this Court grant the motions to intervene."). 
 12.  Id. at 858.  
 13.  See id. at 862 ("We . . . decline to adopt the Special Master’s proposed rule."). 
 14.  See id. at 861 (describing the rule that the Special Master had "distilled," albeit 
incorrectly, from the Court’s holding in New Jersey).  
 15.  South Carolina II, 130 S. Ct. at 862.   
 16.  See id. at 864–68 (applying the New Jersey standard to CRWSP, Duke Energy, 
and Charlotte, respectively). 
 17.  See id. at 864–67 ("Applying the standard of New Jersey v. New York, supra, here, 
we conclude that the CRWSP has demonstrated a sufficiently compelling interest that is 
unlike the interests of other citizens of the States").  Justice Alito went on to note that "[w]e 
conclude, as well, that Duke Energy has demonstrated powerful interests that likely will 
shape the outcome of this litigation."  
 18.   See id. at 867–68 ("We conclude, however, that Charlotte has not carried its 
burden of showing a sufficient interest for intervention in this action."). 
 19.  Id. at 865.  
 20.  See id. at 864‒65 ("The CRWSP is an unusual municipal entity, established as a 
joint venture with the encouragement of regulatory authorities in both States and designed to 
serve the increasing water needs of Union County, North Carolina, and Lancaster County, 
South Carolina.").  
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can properly represent the interests of the CRWSP in this 
litigation."
21
   
 Similarly, Justice Alito granted Duke Energy the right to 
intervene as a separate party upon finding that it "demonstrated 
powerful interests that likely will shape the outcome of this 
litigation."
22
  He determined that, "any equitable apportionment of 
the river will need to take into account the amount of water that Duke 
Energy needs to sustain its operations and provide electricity to the 
region,"
23
 and that "Duke Energy has a unique and compelling 
interest in protecting the terms of its existing FERC license and the 
CRA that forms the basis of Duke Energy’s pending renewal 
application."
24
   
 However, because Justice Alito was unable to distinguish its 
interests from those represented by the State of North Carolina, he 
stated that Charlotte should not be allowed to intervene as a separate 
party.
25
  He noted that, "a State’s sovereign interest in ensuring an 
equitable share of an interstate river’s water is precisely the type of 







 Chief Justice Roberts, in his dissenting opinion, harshly 
criticized the majority, claiming that "[t]he Court’s decision to permit 
non-sovereigns to intervene in this case has the potential to alter in a 
fundamental way the nature of our original jurisdiction, transforming 
it from a means of resolving high disputes between sovereigns into a 
forum for airing private interests."
27
  In his view, the proper course of 
action would have been to deny not just Charlotte, but also CRWSP 
and Duke Energy from intervening in this original action,
28
 because 
"the apportionment of an interstate waterway is a sovereign 
                                                 
 21.  South Carolina II, 130 S. Ct. at 865. 
 22.  Id. at 866. 
 23.  Id.  
 24.  Id. 
 25.  See id. at 867–68 ("We conclude, however, that Charlotte has not carried its 
burden of showing a sufficient interest for intervention in this action."). 
 26.  Id. at 867. 
 27.  South Carolina II, 130 S. Ct. at 869 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 28.  See id. at 876 ("I would grant South Carolina’s exceptions, and deny [all three] 
motions to intervene."). 
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dispute"
29
 whereas determining "a private entity’s interest in its 
particular share of the State’s water . . . is an ‘intramural dispute’ to 
be decided by each State on its own."
30
  He also noted that such 
nongovernmental entities’ interests could have been adequately 
preserved simply by granting them participation as amici curiae.
31
     
 
V. Future Implications 
 
 This ruling appears to signal significant implications for not just 
the Court, but also for nongovernmental entities that are potentially 
seeking to intervene in other equitable apportionment actions as well.  
While the Court did not necessarily expound on the existing New 
Jersey standard—New Jersey’s "appropriate intervention" standard is 
still good law—as noted by Chief Justice Roberts in his dissent, this 
is the first time that the Court has ever allowed private claimants to 
intervene in equitable apportionment actions.
32
  Hence, the latent 
implication of this case appears to be that, so long as an interested 
party—regardless of whether or not it is a sovereign state or a 
nongovernmental entity—can demonstrate that it has compelling 
interests apart from those already represented by an original party to 
the suit, it can intervene in the action.  While it is difficult to 
determine the frequency of such apportionment actions, it can surely 
be expected that CWRSP, Duke Energy, and Charlotte will not be the 
last to petition to the Court to intervene.   
 
 
                                                 
 29.  Id. at 869.   
 30.  Id. at 870 (citing New Jersey). 
 31.  See id. at 876 ("[T]he benefits private entities might bring can be readily secured, 
as has typically been done, by their participation as amici curiae."). 
 32.  See id. at 869 ("Even though equitable apportionment actions are a significant part 
of our original docket, this Court has never before granted intervention in such a case to an 
entity other than a State, the United States, or an Indian tribe.").  See also Lyle Denniston, 
The Key to Settling a Big Fight, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 27, 2010, 7:40 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=111197 ("For the first time in the Court’s history of 
refereeing such interstate disputes, the majority allowed private claimants to something 
owned by sovereign states to assume a key role in the lawsuit."). 
